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ABSTRACT 
The paper provides a new methodology for conflict analysis in choice 
situations with multiple groups, where the information on the various choice 
possibilities is fuzzy in nature. The focus of the paper is on environmental 
conflict management. Starting from a multicriteria perspective, a fuzzy 
clustering technique is applied to identify possibie alliances among groups 
with different interests. After a brief survey of coalition formation theory, the 
methodology is illustrated by means of an empirical land use problem in the 
Netherlands. 
Keywords: Fuzzy sets, environmental management, mult icriteria 
methods, coaiit ions, cluster analysis 
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1. Introduction 
Evaiuation models serve to judge the feasibility and desirability of 
alternative courses of action (plan, projects), based on political choice and 
plausibility criteria. Plan and project evaiuation has become an important 
component of modern public planning and administration. It should be noted 
that different kinds of evaiuation can be distinguished in a policy analysis; one 
of the important discriminating characteristics is between monetary and non-
monetary evaiuation. A monetary evaiuation is characterized by an attempt to 
measure all effects in monetary units, whereas a non-monetary evaiuation 
utilizes a wide variety of measurement units to asses the effects. Cost-benefit 
analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis are well-known examples of a 
monetary evaiuation [31]. 
The history of plan and project evaiuation before World War II showed 
first a strong tendency towards a financial and monetary trade-off analysis. 
Later on much attention was focussed on cost-effectiveness principles. 
Especially after World War II, cost-benefit analysis gained increasing 
popularity in public policy evaiuation, by using willingness to pay notions, 
consumer surplus principles and shadow prices. 
The hypotheses underlying monetary evaiuation methodologies took 
for granted rationél choice behaviour based on a one-dimensional well 
defined performance indicator. The use of such conventional optimization 
models has been criticized trom many sides. Furthermore, in the past 
decades, the degraded state of the natural environment has become another 
key issue in evaiuation, because of the externalities involved and it is 
increasingly taken for granted that environmental and resource problems 
generally have far reaching economie and ecological consequences, which 
cannot always be encapsulated by a market system. The limits inherent in 
conventional evaiuation methodologies and the necessity of analyzing 
conflicts between policy objectives in case of (environmental) externalities 
have led to a need for more appropriate analytical tools for strategie 
evaiuation [30]. 
Multiple criteria evaiuation techniques aim at providing such a set of 
tools. In fact, in the last two decades, it has been understood that welfare is a 
multidimensional variable which includes, inter alia, average income, growth, 
environmental quality, distributional equity, supply of public facilities, 
accessibility, etc. This implies that a systematic evaiuation of public plans or 
projects has to be based on the distinction and measurement of a broad set of 
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criteria. These criteria can be different in nature: private economie (investment 
costs, rate of return, etc), socio-economic (employment, income distribution, 
access to facilities, etc), environmental (pollution, deterioration of natural 
areas, noise, etc), energy (use of energy, technological innovation, risk, etc), 
physical planning (congestion, population density, accessibiiity, etc.) and so 
forth [27, 31]. 
Generally, ecosystems are used in several ways at the same time by a 
number of different users. This complies with the definition of multiple use. 
Such situations almost always lead to conflicts of interest and damage to the 
environment. The consequences range from suboptimal use due to 
unregulated access, to degradation of resource systems due to limited 
knowledge of the ecological process involved. Thus, in the area of 
environmental and resource management and in policies aiming at an 
ecologically sustainable development, many conflicting issues and interests 
emerge. As a tooi for conflict management, multicriteria analysis is then an 
important evaluation method, which has demonstrated its usefulness in many 
environmental management problems. 
In the context of conflicting interests, it is also noteworthy that there is an 
interference from local, regional or national govemment agencies, while there 
is at the same time a high degree of diverging public interests and conflicts 
among groups in society. At an intraregional level many conflicting objectives 
may exist between different actors (consumers, firms, institutions, etc), which 
can formally be represented as multiple objective problems and which have a 
clear impact on the spatial organization of a certain area (e.g. industrialization, 
housing construction, road infrastructure construction). At a multiregional level 
various spatial linkages exist which affect through spatial interaction and 
spillover effects a whole spatial system (e.g. diffusion of environmental 
pollution, spatial price discrimination) and which in a formal sense can be 
described by means of a multiple objective programming framework. At a 
supraregional level various hierarchical conflicts may emerge between 
regional govemment institutions and the central govemment or between 
regional branches and the central office of a firm, which implies again a 
multiple objective decision situation. 
From an operational point of view, the major strength of multicriteria 
methods is their ability to address problems marked by various conflicting 
interests. Multicriteria methods can provide systematic information on the 
nature of these conflicts so as to make the trade-offs in a complex situation 
more transparent to decision makers. 
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2. Qualitative Multicriteria Methods for Environmental 
Management 
During the 70's and at the beginning of the 80's a great number of 
multicriteria methods has been developed and used for different policy 
purposes in different contexts. The following distinctions can be made 
regarding the contexts and the scope of multicriteria evaluation methods: 
1) discrete versus continuous methods; 
2) multi-person versus single-person evaluation; 
3) single-step versus multi-step evaluation procedures; 
4) qualitative versus quantitative information. 
We will elaborate the latter feature of multicriteria methods first. 
It has been argued that the presence of qualitative information in 
evaluation problems concerning socio-economic and physical planning is a 
rule, rather than an exception [30, 31]. Thus the re is a clear need for methods 
taking into account qualitative information. In multicriteria evaluation theory, a 
clear distinction is made between quantitative and qualitative methods. 
Essentially, there are two approaches for dealing with qualitative information: 
a direct and an indirect one. In the direct approach, qualitative information is 
used directly in a qualitative evaluation method; in the indirect approach, 
qualitative information is first transformed into cardinal one, while next one of 
the existing quantitative methods is used. Cardinalization is especially 
attractive in the case of available information of a "mixed type" (both 
qualitative and quantitative data). In this case, the application of a direct 
method would usually imply that only the qualitative contents of all available 
(quantitative and qualitative) information is used, which would give rise to an 
inefficiënt use of this. In the indirect approach, this loss of information is 
avoided; the question is of course, whether there is a sufficiënt basis for the 
application of a certain cardinalization scheme. A multicriteria method that 
may use mixed information is the EVAMIX procedure. Another interesting 
method for dealing with mixed information is the so-called REGIME method; 
this method is based on pairwise comparison operations. 
Another problem related to the available information is the uncertainty 
contained in this information. Ideally, the information should be precise, 
certain, exhaustive and unequivocal. But in reality, it is often necessary to use 
information which does not have those characteristics and hence there is a 
need to face the uncertainty of a stochastic and/or fuzzy nature. In fact, if the 
available information is insufficiënt or delayed, it is impossible to estabiish 
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exactly the future state of the problem faced, so that then stochastic 
uncertainty is created. 
Fuzzy uncertainty does not concern the occurrence of an event but the 
event itself, in the sense that it cannot be described unambiguously. This 
situation is very common in human systems. Spatial systems in particular, are 
complex systems characterized by subjectivity, incompleteness and 
imprecision [41, 42, 43]. 
Therefore, the combination of the different levels of measurement with 
the different types of uncertainty has to be considered. Recently, a discrete 
multicriteria method whose impact (or evaluation) matrix may include either 
crisp, stochastic or fuzzy evaluations of the performance of an alternative an 
with respect to a criterion gm has been developed by the present authors [26]. 
From a methodological point of view, two main issues had to be faced: 
the problem of equivalence of the used procedures in order to 
standardize the various evaluations (of a mixed type) of the 
performance of alternatives according to different criteria; 
the problem of comparison of fuzzy numbers typical of all fuzzy 
multicriteria methods. 
This method will now briefly be described here. It can be subdivided into four 
main steps. 
1) Definition of a Fuzzy Reaion of Satisfactory Alternatives 
Given a "consistent family" of mixed evaluation criteria G={gm}, 
m=1,2, M, and a finite set A={an}, n=1, 2 N of potential alternatives 
(actions), a region of satisfactory alternatives can be obtained by defining a 
fuzzy interval of feasible and acceptable values for each criterion. 
From an operational point of view, in public decision making a single 
point-value solution (e.g. weights) tends to lead to deadlocks in the evolution 
of the decision process because it imposes too rigid conditions for a 
compromise. On the contrary, when a higher degree of flexibility is allowed, 
the definition of a fuzzy region of satisfactory solutions could in principle make 
more room for mutual consensus. A natural and flexible way of defining such a 
region is by means of linguistic propositions. 
In traditional mathematics, variables are assumed to be precise, but 
when we are dealing with our daily language, imprecision usually prevails. 
Intrinsically, daily languages cannot be precisely characterized on either the 
syntactic or semantic level. Therefore, a word in our daily languages can 
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technically be regarded as a fuzzy set. In order to allow a formal analysis, a 
mathematical translation of the linguistic propositions is needed. This can be 
done by means of possibility theory [21]. 
2^  Comparison of Fuzzv Sets 
In general, fuzzy approaches to multicriteria evaluation include the 
following limitations: 
most of them are limited to the use of triangular fuzzy numbers; 
the shape of the membership function is not taken into 
consideration or only a part of it is used, which gives rise to a loss of 
information; 
a general problem concerns the "sensitivity" (degree of 
discrimination1) of the solutions. 
Some authors claim that a low degree of discrimination is a negative feature; 
on the contrary, others believe that in a fuzzy context, an attempt to reach a 
high degree of precision of the results is somewhat artificial. We share this 
latter position. In public decision-making in general -and in environmental 
problems in particular- we often face the desire not to be confronted with 
single unambiguous and (sometimes) imposed fixed solutions, but with a 
spectrum of open feasible solutions having each its own merits. 
The present authors have recently developed a new distance metric 
that is useful in the case of continuous membership functions allowing also a 
definite integration. This will briefly be described here. 
If JXA/X) and |0.A2(X) are two membership functions, we can write 
f(x) = c1|iAl(x) and (1) 
g(y) = C2U-A2(X) (2) 
where f(x) and g(y) are two functions obtained by rescaling the ordinates of 
p.Ai(x) and |i.A2(x) through ei and c2, such that 
Jf(x) dx =Jg(y) dy =1 (3) 
Thus our semantic distance is the following: 
Sd (f(x), g(y))= JJI x-y | f(x) g(y) dydx (4) 
1
 The degree of discrimination "refers to the capability of a method to differentiate between 
alternatives the ratings of which differ only slightly f ram each other [43 p.174]" 
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It is easy to show that this distance satisfies the properties of non-negativity 
and symmetry; the proof of the triangle inequality and a Monte Carlo type 
numerical procedure for the computation of such a distance can be found in 
[25]. It has to be noted that without the absolute value sign equation (4) 
becomes a function of the sign, thus allowing the computation of the possibility 
degree of a fuzzy set to be greater than another one (preference index). 
From a theoretical point of view, the following main conclusions can be 
drawn from the above observations: 
(a) the absolute value metric (simple difference) is a particular case of this 
type of distance (preference index); 
(b) by applying this preference index, the problem of the use of only one 
side of the membership functions, common to most of the traditional 
fuzzy multicriteria methods, is overcome. 
3) Pairwise Comparison of Alternatives 
Evaluation requires normally a judgement of the relative performance of 
distinct alternatives based on dominance relationships. 
Six different fuzzy relations are considered here: 
1) much greater than ( » ) 
2) greater than (>) 
3) approximately equal to (=) 
4) very equal to (=) 
5) less than (<) 
6) much less than ( « ) 
The use of such relations is inspired by the same philosophy as the 
definition of a "pseudo-criterion" [33], but here -according to fuzzy principles-
no precise boundary is established, thus allowing a focussed use of each 
single evaluation criterion for different preference modelling situations. 
Furthermore, the decision-maker is not asked to evaluate thresholds (which is 
always a difficult and perhaps arbitrary process), although the choice of the 
membership functions contains always some degree of arbitrariness. 
Given such information on the pairwise performance of alternatives 
according to each single criterion, it is necessary to aggregate these 
evaluations in order to take into account all criteria simultaneously; this is 
done by taking into account the degree of compensation introduced in the 
model, and a measure of the "incertitude" of the evaluations given by the 
entropy concept. 
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4^  Evaluation of Altematives 
The Information provided by a "fuzzy preference relation" can be used 
in different ways, e.g., the degree of truth (t) of statements such as: 
"according to most of the criteria 
a is better than b, 
a and b are indifferent, 
a is worse than b" 
can be computed by means of proportional linguistic quantifiers and 
approximate reasoning rules. 
Pairwise evaluations can be used directly by the decision-maker(s) in 
order to isolate a set of satisfactory solutions. Alternatively, If in a given 
decision environment there is a need to carry out further elaborations in order 
to get a ranking of the altematives (in a complete or partial preorder), this can 
also be done by using further elaborations of approximate reasoning taking 
into account the entropy levels and the relations with all the other actions. 
However, it bas to be noted that all results obtained can provide 
"justifiable" or "defensible" decisions to policy-makers, but in real world 
environmental decision making, it is necessary to interact with many actors 
(often each single actor is represented by complex organizations like town 
councils, trade unions, different associations and so on) each of them having 
different goals and values. Therefore, since, real-world problems are 
generally not direct win-lose situations and a certain degree of compromise is 
needed, a procedure aimed at supporting real environmental policy-makers 
would ideally consider this problem of different (and often conflicting) 
evaluations. Multicriteria evaluation techniques cannot solve all these 
conflicts, but they can help to provide more insight into the nature of these 
conflicts and into ways to arrive at politica! compromises in case of divergent 
preferences in a multi-group or committee system. For this aim, the 
possibilities of coalitions between different interest groups whose preference 
patterns do not show significant differences has to be explored. This will 
briefly be reviewed in the next section. 
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3. Coalition Formation Theory: a Concise Overview 
The aim of coalition formation theory is to predict a set of coalitions 
which are likely to be formed in a given political situation. There are two basic 
schools of thought among those who have applied game-theoretic principles 
to the study of political coalition formation..The two opposing positions can be 
referred to as "size theory" and "policy theory" [19]. 
Size theory originated from Von Neumann/Morgenstem's "minimal 
winning coalitions" [29], and was modified by Riker and Gamson [13, 14, 32] 
into "the size principle". Size theorists assert that parties prefer governments 
of which they are a member and which are "as small as possible". Size 
theorists argue that when a government coalition is voted into office it thereby 
gains control over a fixed sum of benefits which are then subdivided among its 
constituent members (with non-members receiving nothing). Therefore, the 
smaller the coalition, the more benefits are available per member. 
"Policy theorists" such as Leiserson, Axelrod, and De Swaan [4, 11, 20] 
argue that the benefits to the political parties which are generated by a 
particular government come primarily from the policies implemented by the 
government. Since government policies are public goods, the benefits that a 
party may receive from different governments are not necessarily related to 
the size of the governments. Instead, these benefits are related to the 
preferences of that party for the policies of one government compared with 
those of the other. 
There are two major variants of "policy theory": "Minimal range theory" 
developed separately by Leiserson and by Axelrod [4, 20], and "Policy 
distance theory" developed by De Swaan [11]. 
Minimal range theory asserts that a particular party will prefer a 
government coalition of which it is a member and which has a small "range". 
Range can be defined as the distance in the policy space between the policy 
positions of the two most extreme members of a coalition. The argument 
underlying the minimal range hypothesis is that the smaller the range of the 
government, the closer the government policy is likely to be to the policy 
position of any one of its members. The minimal range hypothesis predicts 
thus government coalitions whose range is as small as possible, given that 
they must form a majority. 
De Swaan makes the assumption that a coalition government selects 
its policies by a majority rule. For instance, thinking of the policy space as a 
line, this assumption leads to the conclusion that the policies chosen by a 
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particular coalition govemment will be the policies of the party that is at the 
median of the coalition. According to the policy distance hypothesis, a party 
will prefer to belong to a coalition for which the policy position of the median 
member is close to its own position. 
In policy distance theories, the construction of the predicted set of 
coalitions proceeds in two distinct steps: first, each actor establishes his 
preference ordering among the various possible coalitions, and then 
individual preferences are used to select a subset of all possible coalitions, 
i.e. the set of predicted coalitions. In general, the results of policy distance 
theory are less clear cut than minimal range theory, because it tends to predict 
that any of a relatively large number of coalitions is possible in a given period, 
whereas minimal range theory predicts a more restricted set of possibilities. 
The cornerstone of the theory of coöperatie n-person games [22, 24, 
36] is the characteristic function. The idea is to capture in a single numerical 
index the potential worth of each coalition of players (the representation of 
coalition's worth by a single number implies freely transferable utility). Games 
are defined inessential if no profitable grounds exist for cooperation among 
players. They are essential if some members of coalitions at least, do strictly 
better by sticking together. Mathematically, the characteristic function, 
traditionaliy denoted by v, is a function from subsets of players to the set of 
real numbers. A general property of characteristic functions is that the function 
v is superadditive (any set of players can do at least as well in coalition as in 
any subcoalition), formally, 
v(SuT) > v(S)+v(T) (5) 
which holds whenever S and T have no members in common. 
A special class of games, which may be thought of as "games of 
control" are important tools in the modeHing of organizational and group 
decision processes. They are called simple games and are distinguished by 
the property of having just two kinds of coalitions, namely, winning and losing. 
In the presence of transferable utility, they are c-games, and after suitable 
normalization they give rise to a special single type of characteristic function: 
{ 0 if S is losing (6) 1 if S is winning 
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4. Fuzzy Cluster Analysis in Coalition Formation Theory 
Any political situation is characterized by an information set. composed 
by descriptive data and actors' behavioural rules, represented by assumptions 
that describe the way each actor uses the descriptive information in order to 
establish his own preferences. 
Since, generally real-world problems are not direct win-lose situations 
(simple games), but a certain degree of compromise is needed, the 
assumption typical of voting theory, that actors' preferences are fixed can be 
relaxed, and also strategie aspects may be introduced. 
In real world situations of public decision analysis two main cases can 
be distinguished [38]: 
1) Broad Commonality of Goals (i.e., differences among parties are 
revealed through various trade-offs which they perceive to be most in their 
interest). 
2) Direct Conflict of Goals (i.e., a case where public policy involves an 
explicit division of resources among different sectors of the society or where 
attitudes have led to unreconcilable strong antagonies (e.g. environmentalists 
versus industrialists). 
Given these considerations, it is possible to construct a model 
(performing as a "simulation model") whose main aim is to give relevant 
information on the structure of the decision problem at hand. For example, the 
authority in charge of a decision can try to forecast the possible behaviour of 
the relevant interest groups. 
The following main assumptions are made: 
1) only a set of well defined actions has to be taken into account; 
2) the actors evaluate the different actions by means of "linguistic 
declarations" (good, not very good, etc); 
3) the actors are often groups too, but we take for granted that it is possible 
to have their evaluations independently from the way they are derived, 
(in any case, to give a linguistic evaluation of each action can be easier 
than to supply a complete ranking of all actions); 
Given a conflict indicator, a fuzzy cluster algorithm can be used in order 
to have an idea of the coalitions (minimizing such an indicator) that are 
"possible". It should be noted that the formal structure of the model is: 
units=actors attributes=actions. 
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Thus we have to evaluate the similarity among actors given the evaluations of 
the different actions. By using the semantic distance described in section 2 as 
conflict indicator, a similarity matrix (achieved by means of the simple 
transformation s=1/1+d) for all possible pairs of actors can be obtained, so that 
the following clustering procedure is meaningful. 
On an axiomatic basis, cluster analysis can be distinguished in 
deterministic, stochastic and fuzzy. By taking into consideration the "clustering 
criteria", the following distinction exists [1, 7, 17]: 
hierarchical methods, 
graph theoretic methods, 
objective functional methods. 
The hierarchical clustering approach, in particular, allows an evolutionary 
view of the aggregation process and can easily be dealt within fuzzy terms. 
However, in a fuzzy environment a problem exists, i.e. the relation 
between the concepts of partition and equivalence class. In a crisp 
environment, the choice of treatment of data in terms of partitions or 
equivalence relations is a matter of convenience, since the two models are 
fully equivalent (philosophically and mathematically). On the contrary, fuzzy 
equivalence relations and partitions are philosophically similar, but their 
mathematical structures are not isomorphic (e.g. the notion of transitivity is 
unique for crisp relations but has taken several proposed forms in the fuzzy 
case). In Appendix 1 we present the technical details of a fuzzy clustering 
procedure which can be used for an analysis of coalition formation. 
In the next section, the applicability of this procedure for the analysis of 
possible coalitions in conflicting environmental management problems will be 
illustrated by means of a real world land use planning problem. 
5. Environmental Management and Fuzzy Conflict Analysis: 
lilustration by means of a Land Use Problem 
The application used in this section is based on a previous case study 
which was using ordinal information and multidimensional scaling techniques 
[30]. It concerns a study on environmental management in the Netherlands. 
The southern part of Limburg (a province in the south-eastem part of 
the country) is the major centre of the Dutch cement industry owing to the 
special physical structure and condition of the soil in this area. The production 
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of cement is based on the raw material marl. The marl winning takes place by 
extracting this raw material from so-called marl-pits. This is an open-air activity 
which destroys more or less completely the original physical structure of the 
area concemed. There is a company having almost absolute dominance in 
the Dutch cement industry. This company has a concession to extract marl on 
one of the hills in south Limburg, but this concession may finish in the near 
future; thus alternative areas have to be explored. Among the new possible 
areas, the most appropriate one is the Plateau van Margraten; this is a rather 
flat area which is used tor agriculture and for some recreation. It has a unique 
physical structure and it is a rather characteristic area in the landscape of the 
region. Designation of this area for marl winning would fundamentally affect its 
social and ecological value; on the other hand, if the authorities would refuse 
to grant permission for marl winning to the company, this would lead to an 
almost total destruction of the national cement industry and to serious 
unemployment effects for this already weak economie region. This situation 
clearly demonstrates the sharp conflicts between environmental and 
economie interests. 
A first meaningful step toward an evaluation analysis for this land use 
problem is to identify a set of feasible and relevant alternatives. These 
altematives are: 
(1) An implementation of the original plans of the company (i.e. a 
concession for the total area). This guarantees the future position of the 
national cement industry and also favours the employment and welfare in the 
region. Agriculture suffers from some negative impacts, while the negative 
social impacts (for recreation, etc.) are rather high. Finally, the environmental 
damage is very high. 
(2) The use of an alternative area (the Rasberg area, in the same region) 
for marl winning. But this area is much smaller and the physical condition of 
the soil hampers a profitable cement production against current prices. On the 
other hand, the ecological damage is less serious. 
(3) The provision of a concession for one half of the area (Plateau van 
Margraten). This leads to less agricultural losses, while the environmental 
damage is also lower. The economie impacts are less favourable than those 
of the first alternative. 
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(4) A new concession for marl winning on the present area. This is only a 
short-term solution which is less attractive from an economie point of view 
(note that in this case, one would need a multi-period approach, but this is too 
complex for illustrative purposes). 
(5) Import of marl from the Plateau van Vroenhoven, an area in Belgium. 
This solution may be attractive from a social and environmental point of view 
(at least from a national stand-point), but it is less attractive from an economie 
point of view. For simplicity, we ignore the environmental impact of transport of 
marl. 
(6) A restructuring of the company so that it becomes a trade and research 
organization for cement instead of a production unit for cement. This will lead 
to a certain loss of employment, while the future need for such an organization 
is unclear. 
(7) A close-down of all productive activities of the company. This may be 
favourable from the viewpoint of environmentalists and recreationers, but it 
will lead to serious economie problems for the region. 
These altematives are to be judged on the basis of various evaluation 
criteria. Three main groups of criteria can be distinguished, viz. economie, 
social and environmental. These three classes can be subdivided into various 
components. 
A) Economie Criteria 
1) employment in agriculture, 
2) employment in cement industry (including marl winning), 
3) agricultural production, 
4) national production of marl, 
5) value added in cement industry 
B) Social Criteria 
6) residential attractiveness, 
7) recreational attractiveness (daily), 
8) tourist attractiveness, 
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9) congestion created in transportation infrastructure. 
C) Environmental Criteria 
10) quality of physiological structure, 
11) diversity and scarcity of eco- and bio-components, 
12) consistency with existing landscape components, 
13) consistency with existing cultural-historical components. 
It appears that the information concerning the diverse plan impacts is 
rather inaccurate; the degree of uncertainty on the impacts of the plans is high, 
so that quantitative information on these impacts is often not available. A 
representation of such impacts in fuzzy terms seems very appropriate. A 
multicriteria fuzzy evaluation matrix related to the above-mentioned 7 
alternatives and 13 criteria is presented in Table 1. 
Alternat 
ives 
Criteria a i a2 a3 a 4 a5 a6 a7 
91 moderate moderate good . good excellent excellent excellent 
92 excellent excellent moderate moderate good moderate bad 
93 moderate moderate good good excellent excellent excellent 
94 excellent excellent moderate moderate moderate bad bad 
95 excellent moderate bad bad good good bad 
96 moderate moderate bad bad good good bad 
97 good good good excellent excellent excellent excellent 
98 moderate moderate good excellent excellent excellent excellent 
99 moderate moderate moderate excellent excellent excellent excellent 
9 io moderate moderate moderate excellent excellent excellent excellent 
9 n good good good excellent excellent excellent excellent 
912 bad moderate good excellent excellent excellent excellent 
913 moderate good good excellent excellent excellent excellent 
Table 1. Evaluation matrix for a fuzzy land use problem 
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Alternat 
ives 
Interest a-i a2 83 84 as 36 87 
groups 
1 very good good moderate bad fairly fairly bad very bad 
good 
2 very good good moderate bad fairly very bad very bad 
good 
3 very bad fairly bad moderate good very good good moderate 
4 very bad fairly bad fairly bad good fairly good very good 
good 
5 very bad bad fairly bad moderate fairly good very good 
good 
6 very bad good bad good good good very good 
Table 2. Fuzzy evaluations of altematives according to each interest group 
In addition to this fuzzy evaluation matrix, an assessment of the priority 
structures of the diverse interest groups is required. The number of interest 
groups distinguished in this study is six. These groups are: 
1) the board of directors of the company, 
2) the employees of the company, 
3) the farmers' association in Limburg, 
4) the recreational association for South Limburg, 
5) the environmental federation in Limburg, 
6) the residents of the area around the Plateau Margraten. 
In Table 2 the linguistic evaluations of the alternative plans according to 
each interest group are presented. These evaluations were assessed on the 
basis of personal inquiries, interviews, talks with interest groups and study of 
available material. 
By applying our fuzzy multicriteria procedure for each pair of actions, 
the following degrees of truth of a linguistic evaluation are obtained: 
ai is better than a2 t=0 ai is better than 83 x=0 
ai and a2 are indifferent x=l a1 and a3 are indifferent T=0 
ai is worse than &2 x=0 ai is worse than a3 x=0 
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ai is better than 34 x=0 
ai and 34 are indifferent x=0 
ai is worse than a4 x=l 
ai is better than a6 x=0 
a-\ and a6 are indifferent x=0 
ai is worse than a6 x=l 
&2 is better than 83 x=0 
a2 and a3 are indifferent x=0 
a2 is worse than a3 x=0 
a2 is better than as x=0 
a2and as are indifferent x=0 
a2 is worse than as x=l 
a2 is better than a7 x=0 
a2 and 37 are indifferent x=0 
a2 is worse than a7 x=l 
33 is better than as x=0 
83 and as are indifferent x=0 
83 is worse than as x=l 
83 is better than a-j x=0 
83 and a-/ are indifferent x=0 
83 is worse than ai x=l 
a4 is better than a§ x=0 
84 and a§ are indifferent x=l 
a4 is worse than a6 x=0 
as is better than a% x=0 
as and a§ are indifferent x=l 
as is worse than a§ x=0 
ai is better than as x=0 
ai and as are indifferent x=0 
ai is worse than as x=l 
ai is better than a-i x=0 
ai and a-j are indifferent x=0 
ai is worse than a-j x=l 
a2 is better than a4 x=0 
a2 and a4 are indifferent x=0 
a2 is worse than a4 x=l 
a2 is better than a§ x=0 
a2 and a$ are indifferent x=0 
a2 is worse than a§ x=l 
a3 is better than a$ x=0 
83 and a* are indifferent x=0 
a3 is worse than a4 x=l 
83 is better than a6 x=0 
83 and a§ are indifferent x=0 
83 is worse than a6 x=l 
a4 is better than as x=0 
84 and as are indifferent x=l 
a4 is worse than as x=0 
a4 is better than a-j x=0 
84 and a-j are indifferent x=l 
a4 is worse than a7 x=0 
as is better than a7 x=0 
as and a7 are indifferent x=l 
as is worse than a7 x=0 
17 
a6 is bette r than a7 x=0 
a& and a-j are indifferent x=l 
a6 is worse than &7 x=0 
It is clear that almost all linguistic evaluations are quite unambiguous. 
This is caused by four factors: 
the number of criteria in favour of an action; 
the degree of compensation allowed in the aggregation process; 
definition of the membership function of the linguistic operators; 
aggregation operator chosen for the approximate reasoning operations 
(in this spplication we have used the "min" operator which is known as a 
representation of the logic "and", snd therefore it is completely non interactive 
(since a high value cannot compensate2a low one)). 
It nas to be noted thst between sctions 3i and 33, and a2 snd 33, none 
of the possible situations sstisfies the minimum requirement requested by the 
linguistic operator "most"; this csn be interpreted as a difficulty in the 
comparison which might bring about an incomparsbility relation. 
On the basis of the above pairwise comparison between alternatives, 
we arrive at the following final ranking of alternatives: 
{a4, a5) ae, 87} > {a-\, az, a^}. 
This means that we obtain two subsets of alternatives. The best subset 
contains a*, as, a& and 87. On the basis of the pairwise comparison results, it is 
not possible, however, to rank the alternatives within the two subsets. 
An higher degree of discrimination (on the basis of technical grounds) 
can be obtained by means of a complex procedure whose details can be 
found in [26]. The result of such a procedure is the following 
Be — a^s —>a4 —»a7 —>ai -»a2 
a3 
However, since a weighting of criteria is not assumed and no consideration is 
given to the "minority principle" (like the discordance index in the ELECTRE 
2
 By compensation in the context of aggregation operators for fuzzy sets is meant the 
following: "Given that the degree of membership to the aggregated fuzzy set is p.Agg (xk) = 
f(M-A(xk). M-B(xk)) = k, f is compensatory if nAgg (xk)= k is obtainable for different nA(xk)by a 
change in uefck) [42 p. 36]". 
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methods) such a procedure must be integrated with conflict minimization 
methods which allow policy-makers to seek for "defensible" decisions that 
could reduce the degree of conflict (in order to reach a certain degree of 
consensus) or that could have a higher probability of being accepted by 
certain groups of decision-makers. 
Taking into consideration the possibility of coalitions among the 
different interest groups, the following results can now be obtained. 
By applying the semantic distance as defined in (4), after the 
transformation s= 1/1+d, the following similarity matrix for all possible pairs of 
interest groups is obtained: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1 0.729 0.426 0.399 0.403 0.403 
2 0.729 1 0.410 0.386 0.390 0.390 
3 0.426 0.410 1 0.675 0.584 0.569 
4 0.399 0.386 0.675 1 0.729 0.672 
5 0.403 0.390 0.584 0.729 1 0.595 
6 0.403 0.390 0.569 0.672 0.595 1 
This means for example that the highest similarity occurs for interest groups 1 
and 2. These interest groups have a relatively high correspondence of goals, 
accordingly. The reverse holds true for interest groups 2 and 4 where the 
lowest degree of similarity is found. 
Application of the clustering procedure presented in Appendix 1 leads 
to the following results. As long as the similarity degree a required for a 
coalition is higher than .729, there will be no coalition formation. Two 
coalitions will be formed when cc is between .729 and .675 (1 and 2), and (4 
and 5). When the similarity degree is reduced to .675 and .672, interest 
groups 3 and 6 join the last coalition, respectively. The conflict of interest 
between the remaining coalitions (1, 2) versus (3, 4, 5, 6) is considerable as 
can be inferred from the low similarity degree associated with a grand 
coalition. 
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1 1 2 3 4 5 6 
.729 
.675 
.672 
.426 
These results are quite well in agreement with prior expectations about 
the attitudes and behaviour of the interest groups. The interests of the 
company and of its employees seem to run fairly parallel. The agricultural 
interest group seems to take an intermediate position, but it joins quite soon 
the coalition made by the recreation and environmental groups. The priority 
patterns of the recreation group and the environmental group bear a very 
close correspondence. The residential group presents a more individualistic 
character since it can be considered a clear case of a "NIMBY" (never in my 
back yard) syndrome; in any case, it is closer to the interests of the recreation 
and environmental groups than to those of the economie groups. 
It is interesting to note that the alternatives strongly supported by 
interest groups 1 and 2 (a-i, a2) have bad environmental impacts. All the 
alternatives considered "good" from an environmental point of view are more 
or less well-accepted by interest groups 3, 4, 5, 6. Among the actions of this 
group, a6, as, and a4 are clearly compromise solutions in nature while ayis a 
too extreme solution (closedown of all productive activities) but which clearly 
presents a high performance from a social and environmental point of view; as 
is the only altemative which minimizes the conflicts. Both ae and a4 will 
strongly be rejected by interest groups 1 and 2. 
Up till now a weak element in this analysis is the lack of strategie 
considerations leading to new coalitions or alliances. In fact, the clustering 
algorithm only indicates the groups whose interests are close in comparison 
2 0 
to the other ones. This is more or less in agreement with the hypotheses 
underlying the "minimal range theory". This theory is quite plausible in the 
case of "broad commonality of goals". On the contrary, in the case of "direct 
conflict of goals", game-theoretic elements such as the notion of "power" need 
to be introduced. Furthermore, attaching to each interest group the same 
weight can be an oversimplification of. a real-world situation. Such an 
introduction of strategie elements in this analysis of coalitions should be 
undertaken in future research. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this contribution we have illustrated how qualitative multicriteria 
methods can be used in evaluation problems with conflicting objectives 
related to economie and environmental impacts. It is shown how fuzzy set 
approaches can be used to generate a ranking of alternatives in order of 
attractiveness according to the preference of a decision-maker. As long as 
there is only one decision-maker, this approach is directly applicable. In this 
case, multicriteria methods have a normative orientation in the sense that they 
are an aid to the decision-maker to find out which altemative is most attractive 
given his or her preference structure. 
In the case of more than one decision-maker such a normative 
approach is still useful for each decision-maker or interest group to determine 
the most preferred altemative. But the fina'l decision to be taken cannot be 
determined in this case only on technical grounds. It depends among others 
on relative power, and decision rules and practices. The second part of this 
paper no longer has a normative orientation. It addresses the question to what 
extent decision-makers have different evaluations of the alternatives. This 
gives the approach an analytical orientation: the analysis of similarity of 
interests is an input for the analysis of the formation of coalitions. In this paper 
we have shown that fuzzy cluster analysis is a useful tooi to study the coalition 
formation process. 
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APPENDIX 1 
We start the discussion on fuzzy cluster analysis with the definition of a 
crisp equivalence relation. 
Let X={x-i, X2,....,xn} be any finite set. Then an nxm matrix R=[nj] = [r(xj, Xj)] is a 
crisp equivalence relation on XxX if 
rn=1 1 <i<n (reflexivity) 
rprji 1<i*j<n (symmetry) 
{ r r 1 Tjk=1 rik-1 Vi.j.k (transitivity) 
Let R be a fuzzy binary relation with |iR(Xj, XJ) indicating the degree to which 
two elements Xj and Xj are similar (similarity matrix). The relation R is obviously 
reflexive and symmetrie, thus it is called a resemblance relation. 
A fuzzy relation is a similitude relation if it has the following properties: 
M-R(XJ, XJ)=1 V (Xj, Xj) € XxX (reflexivity) 
U,R(XJ, XJ)=|IR(XJ, xO V (Xj, Xj) e XxX (symmetry) 
HR(Xi, xk) > max min [jiR(Xi, Xj), JIR(XJ, xk)] 
V (XJ, Xj), (Xj, x^, (Xj, Xk) e XxX (max-min transitivity) 
Note that compared to the notion of transitivity in conventional analysis, the 
present notion defines a weak transitivity of similarity. 
If one wants to derive a set of equivalence classes (and not simple 
partitions) there is a need for the similarity matrix being at least max-min 
transitive. As it is known [21], a method to transform an intransitive similarity 
matrix into a transitive one is to derive the transitive elosure R of R. The max-
min transitive elosure of a fuzzy binary relation R is 
R = R u R 2 u R 3 u . . . 
where R2= R°R is the max-min composition of R. 
The element J IROJ, XJ) indicates the max-min transitive similarity of Xj 
and Xj. 
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A Standard operation for two fuzzy relations is the max-min composition: given 
two relations R(x, y), S(y, z) defined on XxY and YxZ, respectively, the max-
min composition of R and S, denoted as R°S, is defined by 
|1ROS(X, z)= max min [u,R(x, y), jJ.s(y. z)] 
yeY 
xeX, yeYandzeZ. 
By using the notion of max-min composition, one is allowed to derive new 
fuzzy relations. A transitive closure can be obtained by means of the following 
theorem. 
Let R be any fuzzy binary relation. If for some k, the max-min composition 
Rk+1=Rk, then the max-min transitive closure is 
R = R u R 2 u R 3 u uRk 
Knowing that a fuzzy set A can always be decomposed into a series of a-level 
sets A a , the similitude relation R can be decomposed into 
R= U a-Ra 
06P.1] 
where 
f 1 if M-j^ Xj.Xj^ a 
'R(Xi'Xj)= S 
and a2>a 2 => R a ^ &a2 
Since R a is reflexive, symmetrie and transitive in the sense of ordinary sets, 
then it is an equivalence class of level cc. Within each a-level equivalence 
class, the similarity of any two units is no less than a. 
Note that the equivalence classes obtained are ordinary disjoint sets. In fact, 
in order to have non-mutually exclusive equivalence classes, it is necessary to 
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assume the use of a min-addition transitive distance matrix (which is a 
stronger assumption than max-min transitivity). 
It can be proved that the following four algorithms generate the same 
partition [23 pp. 157-167]: 
the single linkage method, 
the connected components of an undirected fuzzy graph, 
the transitive closure of a reflexive and symmetrie fuzzy relation, and 
the maximal spanning tree of a weighted graph. 
Then the following consequences can be drawn: 
1) since the connected components are independent of the numbering of 
the vertices, the algorithm is independent of the ordering of the inputs, 
and therefore it is stable; 
2) no reversal exists in the dendrogram (reversal meaning that the 
merging levels are not monotonically decreasing, and thus a cut of the 
dendrogram may produce ambiguous results); 
3) one is not obliged to use only the Euclidean metric (e.g. like in the 
"centre of gravity" procedures), but any distance measure (even if it 
does not respect the triangular inequality property) can be used; 
thus the method is quite general. 
As an illustration of the application of the max-min composition we use 
the following similarity matrix as a starting point: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1 0.729 0.426 0.399 0.403 0.403 
2 0.729 1 0.410 0.386 0.390 0.390 
3 0.426 0.410 1 0.675 0.584 0.569 
4 0.399 0.386 0.675 1 0.729 0.672 
5 0.403 0.390 0.584 0.729 1 0.595 
6 0.403 0.390 0.569 0.672 0.595 1 
By using the notion of max-min composition, the following new fuzzy relations 
are derived: 
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R2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1 0.729 0.426 0.426 0.426 0.426 
2 0.729 1 0.426 0.410 0.410 0.410 
3 0.426 0.426 1 0.675 0.675 0.672 
4 0.426 0.410 0.675 1 0.729 0.672 
5 0.426 0.410 0.675 0.729 1 0.672 
6 0.426 0.410 0.672 
R3 
0.672 0.672 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1 0.729 0.426 0.426 0.426 0.426 
2 0.729 1 0.426 0.426 0.426 0.426 
3 0.426 0.426 1 0.675 0.675 0.672 
4 0.426 0.426 0.675 1 0.729 0.672 
5 0.426 0.426 0.675 0.729 1 0.672 
6 0.426 0.426 0.672 
R4 
0.672 0.672 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1 0.729 0.426 0.426 0.426 0.426 
2 0.729 1 0.426 0.426 0.426 0.426 
3 0.426 0.426 1 0.675 0.675 0.672 
4 0.426 0.426 0.675 1 0.729 0.672 
5 0.426 0.426 0.675 0.729 1 0.672 
6 0.426 0.426 0.672 0.672 0.672 1 
Since in the series of max-min compositions R3=R4, the transitive 
closure is 
R = R u R 2 u R 3 = R 3 
Since R is a similitude relation, it can be decomposed into equivalence 
classes with respect to the degree of similarity oc. 
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